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Abstract—In this paper we use game theory to model poisoning
attack scenarios. We prove the non-existence of pure strategy
Nash Equilibrium in the attacker and defender game. We then
propose a mixed extension of our game model and an algorithm
to approximate the Nash Equilibrium strategy for the defender.
We then demonstrate the effectiveness of the mixed defence
strategy generated by the algorithm, in an experiment.
Index Terms—Adversarial Machine Learning, Poisoning At-
tacks, Game Theory, Nash Equilibrium, Secure Learning
1. Introduction
Machine Learning (ML) algorithms are widely used in
today’s world. One of the major security threats to ML
models is the poisoning attack, where an adversary tries
to control a fraction of training data and inject malicious
data points to degrade the model’s performance or subvert
the model outcome. Authors in [1] proposed an optimal
poisoning attack, as well as a distance-based anomaly de-
tection filtering mechanism for the defender. The success
of this approach highly depends on selecting the correct
filtering strength of its underlying detection mechanism. A
highly-optimistic choice of filtering makes the ML model
vulnerable as the attacker can craft an attack to inject
extreme poisoned data points (far from centroid at the
boundaries of feature space) and circumvent the detection
model. An overly-pessimistic choice of filtering (removing
points relatively closer to centroid) strengthen the detection
of poisoned data at the expense of ML model’s accuracy
due to the removal of genuine data points.
An important problem to investigate is when the defence
against poisoning attacks is expanded into a game [2],
where the attacker aims to mislead the ML model while the
defender deploys mechanism (e.g., filtering) to secure the
algorithm. Studying behaviours of both parties when their
strategies converge is a prerequisite of developing ML algo-
rithms that are resistant to poisoning attacks while remaining
maximally accurate. The objective of this paper is to find
the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the game model of poisoning
attack and defense. Identifying the NE strategy will allow us
to find the optimal filter strength of the defending algorithm,
as well as the resulting impact to the ML model when both
the attacker and the defender are using optimal strategies.
We are making three contributions: 1) we use game-
theoretic modeling to formulate poisoning attacks, 2) we
prove the non existence of pure NE in our game model, and
3) we propose a mixed NE strategy for the game model and
show that the strategy is effective.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
2 we discuss a number of related work. In Section 3 we
formulate the poisoning attack and defence as a game model
and provide the proof for non-existence of pure NE. In
Section 4 we propose the mixed strategy NE of our game
model. In Section 5 we report our preliminary experimental
results and we conclude in Section 6.
2. Related Work
Authors in [3] formulated a poisoning attack scenario as
the following bi-level optimization problem and described
efficient approaches to solve this problem:
Dc ∈ argmax
Dc∈φ(D)
OA(Dval, w
′)
subject to w′ ∈ argmin
w′∈W
L(DT ∪Dc, w′)
where Dc is the set of malicious data points, φ(D) is a
function that maps the malicious points onto the feasible
domain, OA is the attacker’s objective function, Dval is the
validation dataset used by the attacker, w′ is the trained clas-
sifier, and DT is the original training dataset, and L is the
loss function of the ML model. By solving this optimization
problem, the attacker aims to find the best possible malicious
data points to inject. Note that although the attacker may
not have access to DT directly, he can acquire an auxiliary
training dataset with a similar distribution to DT , then the
attacker can perform the attack to the auxiliary dataset and
use the resulting set of malicious data points to contaminate
DT [4].
To mitigate poisoning attacks, authors in [5] introduced
distance-based filtering mechanisms for the defender, which
is capable of mitigating the optimal poisoning attacks. To
apply the filtering method, the defender computes the cen-
troid for each class and removes the data points that are
too far away from the centroid of each class. Authors in
[1] proposed a similar distance based filtering mechanism
by training an anomaly detection model using a trusted
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dataset from the training data. There are other types of
data sanitization techniques, such as Reject on Negative
Impact(RONI) [6] and PCA-based detection models [7].
One limitation to the results in [1] and [3] is that, the
attacker’s strategy is chosen under the assumption that no
defender is present. Furthermore, the defensive algorithm
is shown to be effective only when the poisoning data
points are placed optimally (and as a consequence, highly
detectable). In reality, a sophisticated attacker would adjust
his poisoning strategy, taking into account the defensive
mechanism, while the defender is also updating his strategy
accordingly. In that situation, we can view the poisoning
attack as a competitive game between the attacker and the
defender. Authors in [5] investigated the attacker’s strategy
as a minimax game with the defender, but they only consid-
ered the case in which the defender uses a pure strategy (i.e.
the strength of filter is fixed and is known by the attacker).
In this case, the obvious optimal attack strategy is to place
the poisoning points close to the boundary of the filter.
In our research we omit the assumption of pure strategy
and in fact we prove its non-optimality. Studying the Nash
Equilibrium(NE) of this game model is highly important
as it not only provides us the insight to a decent defense
strategy, but also allows us to estimate the accuracy impact
on the ML model under different poisoning attacks.
3. Proof of Nash Equilibrium
In this section we first provide three preliminary defi-
nitions of Game theories, Nash equilibrium and Zero-sum
games. Then we provide a proof for non-existence of pure-
strategy in the attacker-defender game model in poisoning
attack scenarios.
Game Theories: The poisoning attack scenario can be
formulated as a two player competitive game model. In
this game model, X1 and X2 denote as the pure strategy
sets (the set of legal moves) of player 1 and player 2
respectively, n1 and n2 represents the cardinality of X1
and X2. Let X = X1 × X2 represents all possible com-
binations of choices made by the players with cardinality
n1 ∗ n2. Then each player’s payoff function is denoted as
ui : X → R, and the global payoff function will be denoted
as U(x) = {u1(x), u2(x)} for every x ∈ X .
Nash Equilibrium: Nash Equilibrium (NE) is the equilib-
rium strategies of all players in a competitive game. When
all players in the game are using the NE strategies, no
players can benefit by changing his strategy. According to
Nash’s Existence Theorem [8], every finite game has at least
one NE. For infinite games, where each player’s choice is
from an infinite set (e.g., choosing a price for his product,
which could be any real number), NE also exists if the set of
choices are compact and the payoff function is continuous
[9]. An NE can be a pure strategy equilibrium, where all
players will stick with one choice all the time (e.g., in a
game where each player picks a number simultaneously
from 0 to 10, the highest number wins; thus all players will
pick 10 all the time). However, a game will more likely
have a mixed strategy NE, where each player’s strategy is
a probability distribution over all possible choices (e.g., in
Rock-Paper-Scissors, the NE strategy is to pick rock, paper
and scissors 1/3 of the times).
Zero-sum games: In zero-sum games, the total benefit to
all players in the game, for every combination of strategies,
always adds to zero. In other words, a player benefits only
at the equal expense of others. More formally, the players’
utility function holds at u1(x) = −u2(x). According to [10],
a game is payoff secure if for every x ∈ X and every  > 0,
each player can secure a payoff of U(X) −  at x. That
is, each player has a way to guarantee his payoff at every
x ∈ X , even if the other player deviates from x slightly. All
continuous games (infinite games with continuous payoff
functions) possesses this property, but many discontinuous
games also do, as described in 4.1.
3.1. Non-Existence of Pure Strategy NE
In our game model, the attacker (denoted by a) chooses
a set Sa = {[r1, n1], [r2, n2], ...[rm, nm]}, where for each
radius ri ∈ Sa, ni poisoning points will be placed opti-
mally within ri distance from the centroid of the original
dataset (
∑m
i=1 ni = N , where N is the total number of
maliciously injected points). Since the poisoning points are
placed optimally, we can expect their locations to be near the
boundary of the hypersphere with radius ri. The defender
(denoted by d) also chooses θd as the radius of the filter. Any
data points outside the hypersphere centered at the centroid
of the original dataset with radius θd will be removed.
This strategy by the defender is justified even though the
defender does not have access to the original dataset, and
the attacker’s poisoned points may influence the position of
the centroid. This is because the influence is dependant on
the method used by the defender to compute the centroid
(e.g., using median vs. mean), as long as the defender uses a
good method to find the centroid (i.e. a method less affected
by the outliers), and the proportion of malicious points in
the training dataset is relatively small, the position of the
centroid will not be changed drastically by the malicious
datapoints. In this game, the attacker and the defender
choose Sa and θd simultaneously, and the outcome of the
game is determined as the followings:
• If a poisoning point i is not removed (i.e. θd ≥ ri ∈
Sa), the attack produces E(ri, ni) payoff for the at-
tacker. The greater ri is, the higher the payoff for the
attacker. The attack yields
∑
{ri∈Sa|θd≥ri}E(ri, ni)
payoff for the attacker in total.
• In addition, the defender pays additional cost Γ(θd)
for removing genuine data points. The smaller θd is,
the higher the cost.
Thus the payoff functions can be represented
as: U(Sa, θd) = Ua(Sa, θd) = −Ud(Sa, θd) =∑
{ri∈Sa|θd≥ri}E(ri, ni) + Γ(θd)
Proposition 1: In this game model, a pure strategy Nash
Equilibrium is very unlikely to exist.
Proof. The best respond functions (BRF) [8] of the attacker
and the defender are:
βa(θd) =
{
[θd, N ] θd ≥ Ta (1a)
all ri ≥ Ta otherwise (1b)
βd(Sa) =
{
B if ri ≤ Td,∀ri ∈ Sa (2a)
ri −  ri = min{ri ∈ Sa|ri > Td}(2b)
where,
• Ta is the minimum distance from the centroid
where poisoning points yield benefit for the attacker:
E(ri, ni) ≤ 0,∀ri <= Ta. Since E(ri, ni) is not
affected by θd (only
∑
{ri∈Sa|θd≥ri}E(ri, ni) is
affected by θd), the value of Ta is only dependant
on the distribution of the original dataset.
• Td is the distance from the centroid where moving
θd towards the centroid causes the defender’s payoff
to be strictly lower than Ud(Sa, Td). Ud(Sa, i) <
Ud(Sa, Td),∀i < Td. This value is determined by the
original dataset and the attacker’s poisoning strategy
(this is not known by the defender in practice, but
is valid under BRF analysis).
• B is the boundary, aka maximum possible distance
from the centroid.
Suppose that (S∗a , θ
∗
d) are the NE strategies. Then{
(S∗a , θ
∗
d) ∈ βd(S∗a)
(θ∗d, S
∗
a) ∈ βa(θ∗d)
In such condition, the NE strategy set (S∗a , θ
∗
d) must satisfy
one of 1a and 1b, as well as one of 2b and 2a. Denote rmin
as the minimum radius in Sa such that rmin > Td. In the
remainder of the proof, we relax the condition above into
the following: {
(r∗min, θ
∗
d) ∈ βd(S∗a)
(θ∗d, r
∗
min) ∈ βa(θ∗d)
Note that each choice of rmin ∈ βa(θd) may represent
multiple possible attacker’s responses Sa. Therefore, if the
NE (r∗min, θ
∗
d) does not exist for this relaxed problem, the
NE for the original problem will not exist either. Clearly 1a
and 2b cannot be satisfied simultaneously, as βa(θd) = rmin
and βd(rmin) = rmin −  does not intersect. Similarly 1b
and 2a does not intersect because 1b has condition θd < Ta,
but βd(Sa) = B and B >> Ta. 1a and 2a also does not
intersect, as βa(θd) = rmin intersects βd(rmin) = B at
(B,B), which violates the condition of 2a.
The only possible intersection of the BRFs is 1b and 2b.
This will occur when Ta ≥ Td, at (θd = Ta, rmin = Ta+).
However, it is impossible to have Ta > Td, because the
attacker will not place poisoning points inside Ta (doing so
yields no profit). If the defender move θd from Ta towards
Td, he will lose from Γ(θd) and gain nothing from E(Sa),
thus violates the definition of Td. In very rare cases, Ta may
be exactly equal to Td, but such situation is very uncommon
and therefore its NE is inapplicable to most ML applications.
4. Poisoning Attack Threat Model
Given non-existence of pure strategy NE, in this section
we first prove that a mixed strategy NE exists and then
propose the mixed extension of our game model.
4.1. Mixed Strategy NE
When players adapting mixed strategies, the defender
does not have to use the same value of θd all the time.
Instead, he may have a set of possible values for θd and
choose the value based on a probability distribution in each
game. Similarly, the attacker can choose his strategy using a
probability distribution. Denote Md as the set of probability
measure on the Borel subset of all possible values of θd,
Ma as the probability measure on the Borel subset of all
Sa. Ma and Md are the mixed strategy sets. Denote Xa and
Xd as the pure strategy set of the attacker and the defender
respectively, and X = Xa × Xd, then we can extend the
utility function into U(σ ∈ (Ma×Md)) =
∫
X
U(Sa, θd)dσ,
where σ represents the mixed strategy chosen by the attacker
and the defender.
Proposition 2: In this game model, a mixed strategy NE
exists.
Proof. According to [10], if the mixed-extension of the
game is reciprocally upper semi-continuous and payoff se-
cure, then it has a mixed strategy NE. A zero-sum game is
always reciprocally upper semi-continuous in its mixed ex-
tension [10]. Furthermore, our game model is payoff secure,
because decreasing θd slightly will at worst decrease Ud
slightly, if we make a continuous approximation on Γ(θd),
as long as the attacker’s mixed strategy does not change too
much. Similarly, decreasing a radius in Sa slightly will at
worst decrease Ua slightly. Therefore, our game possesses
a mixed strategy NE.
4.2. Game Model
For this research, we will model the poisoning attack
scenario as a competitive zero-sum game [11] between the
attacker and the defender, who uses the filtering mechanism
described in [1]. In our game model, the attacker starts by
injecting malicious data set DC into the original training
data DT . Then, the defender calculates the radius of the
filter θ using the estimated percentage of malicious data,
and applies the filtering algorithm A(DT , θ)→ DF ⊆ DT .
Practically, the attacker will not know θ ahead of time, and
the defender is unaware of the attack. Therefore we can
safely model their behaviours as choosing DC and θ si-
multaneously, then evaluate the outcome using the attackers
objective function Oa(Dval, DC , θ), where Dval is the data
set used to evaluate the attackers objective. The distribution
of Dval is solely dependant on the attackers goal, while DC
and θ are used to train the model. We can clearly see that
this is a continuous competitive game model, as the attacker
is trying to maximize the value of Oa(Dval, DC , θ), while
the defender aims to minimize it.
One of the key properties of the NE of this game model
is that, the defender’s strategy must meet the following
conditions:
1) The defender uses a mixed strategy m ∈Md with at
least two pdf(θd) > 0, where pdf is the probability
density function of m.
2) For every θd in the defender’s mixed strategy
m ∈ Md with pdfm(θd) > 0, the product of
E(θd) and cdfm(θd) must be equal, where cdf is the
cumulative density function of m, counting from B
towards the centroid.
Proof. Suppose that a defender’s strategy m∗ is a NE
strategy that does not meet one of those conditions. In the
previous section we have shown that condition 1 must be
satisfied for all NE strategies in our game model. Although
the attacker is allowed to use mixed strategy, if the defender
uses only pure strategy, then the attacker’s best response is
also in pure strategy. Therefore neither the attacker nor the
defender need to adjust their BRF, hence condition 1 can be
validated with the proof procedure in the previous section.
If condition 2 is not satisfied, then:
∃(θx, θy) ∈ m∗|cdfm∗(θx) ∗ E(θx) > cdfm∗(θy) ∗
E(θy) ∧ pdfm∗(θx) > 0, pdfm∗(θy) > 0
Then, the attacker will not place any malicious points
on θy, because doing so yields less profit than placing on
θx. Then, the defender may increase the value of θy until
cdfm∗(θx) ∗ E(θx) = cdfm∗(θy) ∗ E(θy) (or if θy = B, we
can shift probability from θx to θy). This will reduce Γ(m)
and hence increase the defender’s profit without altering the
attacker’s choice of strategy (θx remains no less attractive
than θy throughout this process). This contradicts with the
assumption that m∗ is the NE strategy.
We have shown that any strategy that does not meet
the above conditions are not NE strategies, therefore a NE
strategy must possesses the properties above.
Note that when these conditions are met, malicious
points placed on each θd with pdfm(θd) > 0 yields the same
profit for the attacker. Therefore the attacker is indifferent
among his strategies (as long as all malicious points are
placed on some θd with pdfm(θd) > 0 in any combination).
The NE strategy of the defender is simply the strategy
which minimizes the attacker’s profit while satisfying the
conditions above. Using these properties, we can derive
an algorithm to approximate the defender’s NE strategy
(Algorithm 1). The algorithm starts with a set of initial
filter radii. In every iteration, the algorithm calculates the
probability that satisfies the conditions described in the proof
above for every radius in the set. Then it performs gradient
descent on the set of radius to minimize the defender’s loss
function. Notice that placing all poisoning points within
the strongest filtering radius rmin is one of the optimal
attack strategy, therefore we can safely use its resulting loss
N ∗ E(rmin) to represent the loss from an optimal attack.
Computing an exact NE strategy may be time consuming
and infeasible due to the unbounded number of radius that
the defender can include in his mixed strategy. However,
computing the NE strategy which uses a fixed number of
radius is possible and is usually sufficient in practice as
described in the next section.
INPUT:
1) Γ(p) - the estimated loss for removing genuine
points(p = fraction of points to remove)
2) E(p) - the maximum effect of a poisoning point
placed in that percentile
3) n - number of radius in mixed strategy
4)  - convergence threshold
5) N - expected number of poisoning data points in
the dataset
OUTPUT:
1) Md - the NE mixed strategy of defender
2) Ud(Md, ∗) - the resulting impact to the ML model
{r1, r2, ..., rn} = chooseInitialRadius(n)
Sr = {r1, r2, ..., rn}
t = 0
while f(Sr)t − f(Sr)t−1 <  do
pdf = findPercentage(Sr)
rmin = min(Sr)
f = N ∗ E(rmin) +
∫ 1
0
pdf(pi) ∗ Γ(pi)dpi
Compute ∇(f(Sr)) = dfdSr
Sr = Sr −∇(f(Sr))
t = t+ 1
end
return {Sr, pdf}, f(Sr)
Algorithm 1: Compute Optimal Defense
5. Experiments
The goal of our experiment is to assess the effectiveness
of our mixed-strategy defense in terms of the changes in the
accuracy of the algorithm when optimal poisoning attacks
are performed. The accuracy of algorithm without our mixed
strategy is considered as the benchmark for comparison. We
used the Spambase dataset1 to train and test our ML model.
To setup the experiment, we started by assessing the
accuracy impact to the ML model under pure strategy attack
and defense strategy. Using pure defense strategy, we made
the assumption that the attacker has full knowledge to the
ML model, including the defense strategy itself. Therefore
the optimal attack in this scenario is to place all poisoning
points near the boundary of the filter. We start by loading the
Spambase dataset, separating the 4601 instances into 70%
of training data (3220 instances) and 30% of test data (1381
instances). Then we performed optimal poisoning attack
and filtering on the training dataset. We assumed that the
attacker can manipulate 20% of the training data. We used
Support Vector Machine (SVM) with hinge loss as our ML
model and trained it for 5000 epoch in every iteration. We
tested the model’s accuracy with different filtering strength,
and the results are reported in Fig. 1. The y-axis is the
accuracy of the ML model, and the x-axis represents the
percentage of data points removed by the filter, which is the
same as 1-percentile of poisoning data.
1. https://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/machine-learning-
databases/spambase/spambase.data
Figure 1: Pure strategy defense under optimal attack
# radius 2 3
Radius 5.8% 15.7% 5.8% 9.4% 16.3%
Probability 51.2% 48.8% 33.3% 33.3% 33.4%
Accuracy 85.6% 86.1%
TABLE 1: Mixed strategy defense under optimal attack
As shown in this figure, applying the filter reduces the
accuracy of the ML model, regardless of the presence of the
attack. However, aborting the filter will enable the attacker
to perform more threatening attacks. Also, we can see that
for this model, the defender loses incentive to increase filter
strength at some point between 10% and 30%, while the
attacker always have incentive to inject, regardless of the
percentile. These facts indicate that no pure strategy NE
exists in this model.
We then ran Algorithm 1 to generate the mixed defense
strategy. The input of the algorithm, E(p) and Γ(p), are
approximated using the results in Fig. 1. We tested the
accuracy of the ML model when the generated defense
strategy is used. Note that the optimal attack in this case is
to place poisoning points near any boundary of the mixed
defense strategy in any combination, as explained in section
4.2. The results of the mixed strategy defence are reported in
Table 1. The number of radius is the input to the algorithm
1, the radii and probabilities are the outputs of the algorithm.
As shown in this table, the accuracy of the ML model
using mixed defense strategy is strictly higher than the
accuracy of all pure defense strategies. This validates the
effectiveness of mixed strategy defense in poisoning attacks.
We experimented filters with n ≤ 5, the accuracy of the
resulting model stays roughly the same after n = 3. The
defender’s strategy becomes a closer approximation to NE
as the value of n increases. However, the computation time
increases significantly when computing high value of n.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we used game theory to model the attacker
and defender strategies in poisoning attack scenario. We
proved non-existence of the pure strategy Nash Equilibrium,
proposed a mixed extension of our game model and an algo-
rithm to approximate the Nash Equilibrium strategy for the
defender, then demonstrated the effectiveness of the mixed
defence strategy generated by the algorithm. One limitation
to our research is that, we used the results from the pure
strategy scenario to approximate E(p) and Γ(p) in order to
compute the optimal mixed defense strategy. It is possible
that a generalized E(p) and Γ(p) exists across all datasets,
which we leave it for future research. Another interesting,
yet more general approach, to address poisoning attacks
which we are interested to investigate is based on detecting
and rejecting samples using auditing algorithms (see [12]
as one general approach for auditing). This approach is
particularly useful when the users’ feedback are sought in
an online fashion to update and improve the trained model.
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